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The Lost and Found Library
paradigm Change in the Memory of the 
Holocaust in Hungary
/  Central European University, Budapest
L'article examine les diiemmes politiques auxquels les organisations juives hongroises ont dQ faire Face pendant 
l'annöe de commemoration de I'Holocauste, en 2014, et i(lustre le changement de paradigme le plus recent dans 
la mömoire de I'Holocauste en Hongrie, Faisant valoir que le respect international de celle-ci par le gouvernement 
actuel peut Stre aussl un moyen eFFicace de susciter un changement de paradigme au niveau national. Cela prouve 
egalement que les lois memorielles conFormes aux normes internationales peuvent etre facilement detournees. 
\1ots-cl6s: Hongrie, politique memorielle illiberale, rävisionnisme de I'Holocauste, göopolitique, double occupation, 
changement de paradigme.
ow could one possibly chance upon 
a library of tens of thousands of 
volumes in the basement of a func­
tioning scientific institution? On 
September 16, 2014, the Budapest 
University of Jewish Studies discov­
ered a complete collection of books 
of Holocaust victims, who had depos­
ited their personal libraries there before they were forcedly 
moved to yellow-star houses or deported. The leaders of the 
University of Jewish Studies assumed that the wide media 
coverage of the “find” would help them securing govern­
ment resources to start organizing and structuring the 
library. They were wrong. The fate of this scattered books 
illustrates the political dilemmas Hungarian Jewish orga­
nizations had to counter during the “Holocaust Memorial 
Year” in 2014, when the government organized commem­
oration of the 70th anniversary of the Shoah. Furthermore, 
it illustrates that international compliance with Holocaust 
remembrance can be at the same time an effective way of 
initiating a paradigm change on the national level. It also 
proves that memory laws complying with the international 
standards can be easily hijacked. Unlike in Poland when a 
new law was passed denying any Polish collaboration in 
the Nazi occupation causing international protest in 2017, 
in Hungary the paradigm change has started earlier and 
within the already existing memory laws.
MEMORY POLITICS AS A STRATEGIC POLITICAL 
WEAPON: "THE DOUBLE OCCUPATION"
In 2010, 2014, and 2018, the right-wing populist Fidesz 
-  in coalition with the Christian Democratic Party (KDNP) -  
won three consecutive elections. During the past five years 
Fidesz has been under international pressure to comply 
with written and unwritten laws, including those related 
to Holocaust remembrance. Still, the party continues to be 
very popular inside Hungary and has increased its electoral 
support considerably (Petö, 2017a, p. 18). This long-term 
victory has several reasons. I wish to analyse how the pol­
itics of memory of this illiberal state contributed to the 
consolidation of Fidesz’s political power.
In the past years, political scientists and analysts scru­
tinizing this impressive series of electoral victories were 
forced to reconsider not only their analytical toolkit, but 
also their concepts when trying to understand the new 
phenomenon of “democratic authoritarianism,” “illiberal 
state, ” or “mafia state”. Together with the Polish sociologist 
Weronika Grzebalska, we compared the cases of Hungary 
and Poland, and based on our findings we argued that we 
are facing a new form of governance, which stems from the 
failures of globalized (neo)liberal democracy (Grzebalska 
& Pet6, 2017, 2018). Based on its modus operandi, we 
called this regime an “illiberal polypore state,” because as 
a parasite, it feeds on the vital resources of the previous
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political system, but at the same time actively contributes 
to its decay by setting up parallel institutions and channel­
ling resources to them. The polypore state works within the 
framework of what is referred to as “mnemonic security” by 
controlling hegemonic forms of remembrance (Mälksoo). 
The translation of history and its application, as well as 
the identity-shaping effect of these manoeuvres become 
geopolitical factors (Pcto, 2017b). This is especially true 
about the memory of the Second World War.
After 1989, along with the revision of progressive politi­
cal traditions, anti-communism, fuelled by the persecutions 
which took place during the Soviet occupation, became the 
foundation of the emerging political discourses within the 
former Eastern Bloc countries (Petö, 2017c). Meanwhile, 
the various states have concealed how far they were his­
torically involved in the system in order to prove that they 
were merely victims.
Because of the failure of the Hungarian political system, 
two armies occupied Hungary: the German army on March 
19,1944, following the unsuccessful Hungarian peace con­
ferences and Romania’s successful change of sides; then 
from the autumn of 1944, the Red Army too. For a long 
time the German and the Soviet occupations were discussed 
independently from each other in Hungarian historiogra­
phy. The Germans, who were Hungary’s allies, basically 
entered the country without facing any resistance, and for 
that reason the German occupation was later often dis­
cussed in the framework of political and diplomatic history. 
But the long Soviet occupation, during which much blood 
was spilled, was rather analyzed as part of the newly built 
political system, communism. This categorization was then 
challenged by the theory of “double occupation” which, 
as part of the turn in memory politics of the early 2000s, 
was meant to revive the myth of Hungarian victimhood 
and thus avoid the uncomfortable questions about Hun­
garian responsibility during the Second World War. The 
Hungarian Holocaust memorialization is challenged by 
two thorny political issues. The first one is the chronology: 
when did the persecution of Jews start? Before the German 
occupation with the numerus clausus law in 1920 and the 
anti-Jewish legislation of 1938, or just after the German 
occupation of 19th March 1944? And when did the persecu­
tion end? In 1945, as the anti-fascist narratives states, or in 
1948 as the revisionist rhetoric claims, since the communist 
Hungarian state persecuted Jews while fighting against 
religion? The question of chronology is also related to the 
second question about the responsibility of the Hungarian 
state in the persecutions.
Before the 2004 European Union enlargement, the new 
member states, including the Visegrâd 4 countries and the 
Baltic States, had successfully lobbied for the acceptance 
of the Memorial Day for the Victims of Communism. It was 
expected to counterbalance the Holocaust Memorial Day, 
created a built-in fracture in the memory culture of Europe’ 
and invisibilized the collaboration of Eastern European
national elites with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. 
In Hungary both memorial days were accepted in 2000, 
during the first Fidesz government. The theoretical frame 
of all these different national memory strategies, which are 
founded on national victimhood, and blame Nazi Germany 
and the Soviets for all the traumas of the 20th century, is 
“repressive erasure” -  a memory frame based on exclu­
sion (Connerton, 2008, p 60-61). Now particularism was 
inserted in a system originally based on universalism.
In 2011 the Hungarian Parliament accepted the Funda­
mental Law of Hungary replacing the Constitution. The 
Preamble {National Confession in the English translation) 
states: “We date the restoration of our country's self-deter­
mination, lost on the nineteenth day of March 1944, from 
the second day of May 1990, when the first freely elected 
organ of popular representation was formed.” With this 
Hungary caught up with other former communist states 
that after the end of the Cold War started to promote the 
memory of “double occupation,” and to increasingly rely 
on the concept of victimhood in their memory politics (Lim, 
2018). In this context memorial years also serve as litmus 
tests. The 2014 commemoration of 1944, the 70th anniver­
sary of the Holocaust in Hungary, illustrates the process of 
how the illiberal polypore state redefines memory politics 
and gains national and international support at the same 
time.
HUNGARIAN RHAPSODY
The paradigm  of “double occupation" equates the 
trauma of the Soviet occupation with that of the German 
occupation (Petö 2014). Political debates turn into debates 
aboLiL the past; in other words: instead of talking about 
their party’s programs, politicians debate various interpre­
tations of history. This of course suits the interest of the 
polypore state, because in the meantime it can dynamically 
develop its system of institutions. The change of paradigm 
also takes place within those international organizations 
that were m eant to protect the previous paradigm. In 
2014, right before the national elections, the Hungarian 
government could not risk losing the Chairmanship of the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), 
which it assumed precisely to be able to foster the new 
turn in memory politics on the international level. This 
turn nationalized the international framework, as well as 
secured the position of Hungarian victimhood in the inter­
national discourse.
The designers of the Hungarian Holocaust Memorial 
Year started from the foundational premises of transna­
tional memory politics; that memory has power and that 
silence is not an alternative. Thus they decided to focus on 
discourse instead, and began to regulate it in accordance 
with their political interests. Next, a battle evolved for the 
power over the discourse of memory politics. However, in 
the meantime through the Civil Alap (Civic Fund), a public
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I. established to finance the Memorial Year, the Hun- 
jiu an government offered monetary support to Hungarian 
!i i s h  communities in order to develop and propagate its 
nnmrative of the Holocaust in Hungary. I.e. the actors of 
I ■ I • Memorial Year engaged with the symbolic battle -  and 
! power struggle -  for the control over die discourse of 
111 ilocaust memory with very different plans and resources.
What we remember is always determined by our cul­
tural framework, moral sensitivity, and political interests.
rgiveness can happen only if it is interconnected with 
■ membrance. The survivor becomes the subject of the 
ocess only when he has the power to forgive the state for 
1 he crime it has committed. The long-term aim would be to 
itablish a “shared memory," a framework within which 
[he survivors’ stories could be told as they were meant to 
he told before the act of recognition takes place. During the 
holocaust Memorial Year the main actors of the process: 
rhe government, the Jewish organizations, the civil sphere, 
and the historians, were all internally divided by duels of 
interest (Gyâni), The events of the Memorial Year as well
as the related decisions all took place on multiple levels.
THE HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL YEAR
There has been a considerable amount of scientific publi­
cations, primarily in English, analyzing the Memorial Year 
based on its media coverage (Kovacs & Mindler-Steiner). 
The articles thus mainly focused on the Hungarian govern­
ment’s historical revisionist attempts and the resistance 
that followed; and relatedly, they discussed the failure of 
the whole Memorial Year project. What I claim is that the 
Memorial Year brought fundamental changes into the Hun­
garian memory politics of the Holocaust independently 
from the first major, organized resistance of Hungarian 
Jewish communities against the state since 1945.
|  The Lost
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dans I ‘extermination de 
plusd’undemi-million 
de Juifs, qui constituent 
I'dcrasante majority des 
victimes de I'occupation 
nazieen1944.
The Janus-faced, double performance of the government 
during the Memorial Year (i.e. that on the international 
stage they made speeches befitting all international expec­
tations and standards, like the speech of President Âder 
during the March of the Living in Auschwitz on 29 April, 
2014, while their actions in Hungary poi nted in exactly the 
opposite direction) leads different experts to different con­
clusions. The most widespread explanation was that with 
the 2014 elections approaching, Fidesz tried to reach out 
to the voters of far-right Jobblk, and used a historical revi­
sionist governmental rhetoric in memory politics, which is 
unparalleled in Hungarian history since 1945.
However, these interpretations were entirely misguided. 
In hindsight it is clearly perceptible that the master plan 
was to change the memory of the Holocaust in Hungary, 
not independently from the worldwide illiberal turn, which 
was fuelled by the 2008 financial, security and migration 
crisis. This was the turn which placed memory politics in 
a national security framework.
In his July 4, 2014 speech, Minister of Defence Csaba 
Hende stated that the goal of the Memorial Year was that 
the Shoah would “take its place in national history,” add­
ing: “may the Eternal help us.’’ This summarizes both 
the pre-existent framework and the intrinsic goals of the 
Memorial Year: to replace the international and suprana­
tional framing of the Holocaust with a national one, and 
its laic framework with a sacral one. The placement of the 
Shoah into a national frame would not be problematic in 
itself (see the recent shifts in Poland); however, the way it 
happened exemplifies the memory politics of the illiberal 
state, which actively reinterprets the post-1945 consensus 
about the Holocaust.
The Holocaust narrative was conceived during the cold 
war, which, besides determining its characteristics, also 
elevated the moral command of “Never Again” into a
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measure of universal integrity. The memory politics of the 
European Union is built on a positive notion, namely: that 
learning from the past is a process through which a negative 
experience may become a positive force. Consequently, 
European citizens should comply with democratic values 
and reject everything that led to the Holocaust -  which, 
according to Frank Fiiredi is a “therapeutic censorship 
[which] both patronizes and infantilizes people” (Fiiredi, 
p. 132). International organizations, like the IHRA, estab­
lished in 2000 with the Stockholm Declaration, supervise 
whether individual states are committed to these values in 
their education, in their museums, and when organizing 
events. Though these values are foundational for the EU, 
presently it is mostly a q uestion of power whether the Euro­
pean memory politics can be further sustained.
The Hungarian Fidesz-KDNP government’s take is exactly 
the opposite of the “Never Again” paradigm; however, as a 
typical illiberal polypore state, they also used that memory 
discourse whenever it was necessary, but to further their 
own political aims. When they rejected the “Never Again” 
discourse, they did so, arguing that it is a tool of “western 
hegemony.” Therefore, one aim of the government with 
the Memorial Year -  and in accordance with its general 
freedom fighter rhetoric -  was to establish its own Holo­
caust terminology. In a related experiment, a historian on 
the government’s payroll, Sandor Szakâly, the director of 
the Veritas Historical Research Institute, the flagship insti­
tute for the government’s memory politics, attempted to 
introduce the expression “police action against aliens” for 
the July-August 1941 deportation of 18 000 foreign Jews 
to Kamencts-Podolsk, where they were murdered by the 
Nazis. Certainly, further battles will follow, but in the long 
run the government’s “cacophonic memory” politics will 
result in the nationalization of the Hungarian Holocaust 
narrative without acknowledging the Hungarian collabo­
ration (Vinitzky-Seroussi & Teeger).
Another aim of the government with the Memorial Year 
was to popularize the discourse of remembrance, so that the 
related questions would not only be discussed by historians 
but also by the broader national community -  it followed 
the same strategy in 2016 concerning the Memorial Year 
of the 1956 revolution (Petö, 2017b). This is exemplified 
by projects financed by the government: companies and 
institutions that had never dealt with Holocaust education 
or research before receiving considerable financial support, 
while other (experienced) entities disappeared; and even 
the sole, state-funded Holocaust institution, the Holocaust 
Memorial Centre, only applied for a modest sum. The “lost 
and found library” got no monetary support either. Before­
hand, there was a consensus among historians about the 
framework and discourse of Hungarian Holocaust research. 
By opening up the framework of remembrance, the gov­
ernment questioned this monopoly of knowledge and gave 
impetus to a series of debates that were not void of personal 
collisions.
The literature on how post-1945 antifascist rhetoric 
invisibilized Jewish identity and the Jews as a group could 
itself fill a library. In the antifascist memory rhetoric, the 
survivors are all victims, while the perpetrators are for­
gotten. Hungarian Holocaust research did not integrate 
into international scholarship after 1989 either. Instead, 
Hungarian researchers used concepts and terminologies 
imported from the west, that is: from a different context. 
The construction of national remembrance coincides with 
nation-building, therefore the historical narrative should 
support the latter. The Hungarian government needed 
a narrative with a beginning and an ending, closed and 
complete with only one interpretation. And this led to the 
greatest conflict in recent history between the Jewish com­
munities and the government.
On April 28, 2014, Tibor Navracsics, Deputy Prime Min­
ister, Minister for Public Administration and Justice stated: 
“After having processed the tragedy of the 20th century, 
having learned from the tragedy of the 20th century, we 
should move on to the 21st century.” That the Holocaust 
would be something that can be ended and closed into the 
past is the diametric opposite of the memory continuity of 
the “Never Again” model. Essentially, the survivors and the 
Jewish community felt that this attempt on closure was a 
dismissal of their memories. This was the foundation of 
the global Holocaust narrative as well as of the European 
human rights paradigm, which separated from the history 
of the war. This was the continuity that the government 
wanted to disrupt. As a result, the MAZSIHISZ, the Feder­
ation of Hungarian Jewish Communities, boycotted the 
state commemorations from February to October 2014. It 
demanded the termination of the House of Fates project; 
the removal of the Memorial of the Victims of German 
Occupation; and the rescinding of the appointment of San­
dor Szakâly, the director of the government funded Veritas 
Historical Research Institute.
THE RESULTS OF THE CHANGE OF PARADIGM
Was there a new, particularly Hungarian memory poli­
tics created dining the Memorial Year? The premises were 
unique: the second largest community of Jewish survivors 
in Europe; the lack of Hungarian Holocaust researchers in 
the international research community; the invisibilizing 
effect of communist memory politics; and the construction 
of the illiberal state. Poland started the nationalization 
of the Holocaust narrative much earlier, with the estab­
lishment of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in 
Warsaw, It is no surprize that since it came to govern­
ment the PiS focuses on the Second World War and the 
remembrance of communism in the battles around memory 
polities and prevents conferences and exhibits that would 
tackle the issue of Polish collaboration or anti-Semitism.
The Hungarian government canonized the narrative of 
“double occupation,” thus relegating all responsibility to
wcMGimai iE« 80 N‘ 9/£t6-Aiitom ne20l9
The Lost
and Found Library
^■unv ing forces. It is not simple to place the dark 
?■' o f  !he past into the ethnocentric memory politics, 
chili w hen there are competing remembrances. There 
E m tiv e  that could harmonize national historiogra-
11 ip. the memories of the various groups of survivors.
1 „h lias multiple levels, and the local, regional, 
,ind transnational memories together create a 
i.cnlnured patchwork. However, all this is embedded
'«ehtn-il processes, therefore some memories stand a 
prince of becoming dominant. The new polypore
E j p  jupported a very particular narrative, but its success 
, , iue to the weakness of those who were supposed
antifascist logic.
<ur l I ■ dy the Memorial of the Victims of German Occu- 
pflior. r. still erect. The obelisk commemorating the victims 
df strt jei occupation was placed in Öbuda, possibly due to 
hiHiŝ iLi Etate pressure, although originally the two were 
mcFiTii ii symbolize the “double occupation” narrative in 
!i n r ,  ■- with the current government’s historical inter- 
H atH V '. The Veritas Institution is still active under the 
H E ufjbtp of its government-appointed director, Sandor 
Siak&b. On August 27, 2015, Szakâly together with the 
Bfederttatives of the MAZSIHISZ placed a wreath on the 
unmi'.'i .ul at Kamianets-Podilskyi, to the event, which a 
fnv. nn iths before, he had termed a “police action against 
K p *  instead of deportation and mass murder.
Thr House of Fates, a state museum for child victims 
at tin- Holocaust, which was also a subject of discussion 
■:.i I in ■ h e  boycott, is scheduled to open in 2019, without 
M t public or professional discussion about its contents. 
I i . .  iuuse of Dialogues, which was designed as its alter- 
nativc, seems to be another stalled project. The Jewish 
Communal Roundtable, which was to handle the conflicts 
riii-i t merged during the Memorial Year, has held no meet- 
mpi since. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of synagogues 
fl tu! J cwish cemeteries has picked up steam (there are close 
io I 600 Jewish cemeteries in Hungary), even though this 
la hardly in concordance with the government claims to 
lie reach out to the youth so that they can experience their 
Jeivish identity as a positive feature.
t here are some positive results: Ferenc Koszonis (1899- 
had his statue unveiled in the Military History
Institute, but he did not enter historiography as the sav- 
lour of Budapest Jewry -  this fictitious narrative remained 
K If hin the confines of right-wing militarist subculture. The 
Wfc-sion that Horthy saved the greatest number of Hungar- 
llii Jews also failed to become part of the mainstream. 
Btilint Homan (1885-1951), a historian and politician con- 
vcted for war crimes has no sculpture yet, although his 
"Habilitation was the major demand of revisionist histo­
rians. During the Memorial Year there were many lectures, 
'creenings and other events about the Holocaust, books, 
hlms and exhibits. The exact amount spent by the state for 
Organizing the Memorial Year has never been disclosed.
Everyone eagerly expected the end of the Memorial Year.
The government achieved its goals, which could have been 
put at risk by any further publicity. Jewish organizations 
were content with the government support that steadily 
arrived for preserving synagogues and cemeteries. The civil 
organizations were also content because it had become 
clear that government resources can be tapped only through 
institutionalised Jewish organizations, which had a strong 
agenda setting effect; the international research community 
stepped up against the Hungarian government’s success­
ful intervention into the consensus in memory politics. 
Fresh, thought provoking artistic projects or commemora­
tive forms were painfully missing from the Memory Year 
which was focusing on documenting the loss and confine 
the memory of the Holocaust to the gone past. And we 
have not heard about the “lost and found library” since. /
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